LIVE · June 17, 2026: India's MeitY has blocked Telegram under Section 69A of the IT Act 2000 following NEET-UG 2026 Re-exam paper leak fraud — affecting over 150 million users. Telegram has filed a legal challenge in Delhi High Court calling the block "unconstitutional." The block is valid until June 22, 2026. This article has been updated to cover the forensic and legal dimensions of this landmark case.
What is BGP Hijacking?
The Silent Heist of the Internet — Now in India's Backyard
How malicious actors reroute global internet traffic, the forensic evidence they leave behind — and why Telegram's 2026 block in India is the most important domestic platform-control case since the TikTok ban.
Imagine sending a registered letter, but the postal network silently re-routes it through a stranger's house — who reads it, may alter it, and only then forwards it to the original address. You never know it happened. This is exactly what BGP Hijacking does to internet traffic. And in a different but forensically connected story unfolding today, India has done something far more visible — pulling the plug on Telegram entirely for 150 million users, using law as the blocking mechanism instead of rogue routing. Both are acts of traffic control. One is a crime. The other is a contested exercise of sovereign power. Every forensic student needs to understand both.
Understanding BGP — The Internet's Postal System
Before grasping the hijack, one must understand the protocol being exploited. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the standardised routing protocol that governs how data packets travel across the internet. It is often called the "postal system of the internet" because it determines the best path for data to travel between different networks.
The internet is not one monolithic network — it is a collection of thousands of independently managed networks called Autonomous Systems (AS). Each AS (ISPs, universities, corporations, government networks) is assigned a unique Autonomous System Number (ASN). BGP is the language through which these ASes communicate reachability information: telling each other which IP address blocks (prefixes) they own and how to reach them.
A BGP route is essentially a map entry that says: "To reach IP addresses in range X, send traffic through AS-A → AS-B → AS-C." Routers across the world maintain BGP routing tables that are continuously updated as networks go online, go offline, or change their connections.
What is BGP Hijacking?
BGP hijacking — also known as prefix hijacking, route hijacking, or IP hijacking — is an attack in which a malicious or misconfigured network operator falsely announces IP address blocks (prefixes) it does not own. Because BGP operates on trust, other routers accept these false announcements and begin routing internet traffic through the attacker's infrastructure instead of the legitimate destination.
In practical terms, think of each Autonomous System as a city on a road network. BGP is the GPS system that tells every vehicle (data packet) the fastest route between cities. A BGP hijack is the equivalent of a rogue city broadcasting fake GPS signals, convincing the entire road network that all routes to "City YouTube" now pass through "City Attacker."
How BGP Hijacking Works — Step by Step
The anatomy of a BGP hijack can be broken down into a clear sequence of events:
208.65.152.0/22) to its neighbours. All routers worldwide update their tables to route traffic to YouTube via this AS.208.65.153.0/24). BGP prefers more specific routes, so the rogue announcement wins instantly.Types of BGP Hijacking Attacks
Same-Prefix Attack
The attacker announces the identical IP prefix as the legitimate owner. Only networks closer to the attacker switch over, causing partial traffic diversion.
More-Specific Attack
The attacker announces a more specific sub-range. BGP's longest-prefix-match rule means all global traffic is diverted — 100% impact. Most devastating type. Used in the 2008 YouTube incident.
Route Forgery
The attacker shortens or forges the AS-PATH attribute to make its route appear more optimal, attracting traffic without announcing a new prefix.
Unintentional Hijack
An AS accidentally re-advertises learned routes beyond their intended scope. Though often non-malicious, route leaks can cause massive disruptions indistinguishable from attacks.
Stealthy Interception
The attacker intercepts traffic, inspects or modifies it, and re-forwards it to the legitimate destination. The most forensically challenging variant to detect.
Traffic Drop / Censorship
Hijacked traffic is dropped entirely — causing a denial of service. Commonly used by state actors to censor internet services within a country.
Why Do Attackers Hijack BGP Routes?
| Motive | Mechanism | Real-World Example | Forensic Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Censorship / Denial of Service | Blackholing hijacked traffic | Pakistan blocking YouTube (2008); Myanmar blocking Twitter (2021) | Service becomes completely unreachable; easy to detect |
| Cryptocurrency Theft | DNS hijack via BGP to redirect users to fake sites | Amazon Route53 hijack → MyEtherWallet theft (2018) | Blockchain evidence; server logs; certificate anomalies |
| Espionage / Traffic Interception | Man-in-the-middle; traffic forwarded after inspection | Russian AS hijacking Visa/Mastercard traffic (2017) | Latency increase; AS-PATH changes — stealthy, hard to prove |
| Spam / Phishing Campaigns | Hijack abandoned IP space to send spam | Spammers routinely abuse dormant prefixes | IP reputation logs; BGP table anomalies |
| Competitive Disruption | Blackholing a competitor's IP range | Theoretical / documented in underground forums | Service outage + abnormal routing in traceroute |
| Accidental Misconfiguration | Human error in BGP configuration | Moratel hijacking Google (2012); China Telecom route leak (2010) | Indistinguishable from malicious attacks forensically |
| Sovereign Platform Control ⬅ NEW | Government-directed ISP-level DNS/IP blocking (not BGP hijack — but uses same ISP infrastructure layer) | India blocking Telegram via Section 69A, IT Act — June 2026 | Full platform blackout; legally mandated; ISP compliance logs; court-challengeable |
India Blocks Telegram — June 2026
A New Dimension in Cyber Forensics: Lawful Platform Shutdown vs. BGP AttackOn June 17, 2026, India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) issued a platform-wide block on Telegram under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 — the same provision used to ban 59 Chinese apps (including TikTok) in June 2020. The immediate trigger: the NEET-UG 2026 Re-Examination, where fraudulent Telegram channels were demanding sums ranging from a few thousand rupees to several lakhs, falsely claiming to sell the re-examination paper.
The NTA itself confirmed that no genuine re-exam paper was in circulation. Every channel claiming to sell one was running an elaborate fraud — many using Telegram's message editing feature to manufacture fake "proof" of leaked papers. MeitY acted on NTA recommendations after earlier channel-by-channel takedowns repeatedly failed to contain the scam network.
Telegram founder Pavel Durov immediately called the block a "rash decision" that punishes ordinary users rather than insiders who actually leaked materials. The company filed a legal challenge in Delhi High Court on June 17 itself, arguing the block was "unconstitutional," "grossly disproportionate," and an "overbroad restriction on free speech." The case was adjourned to June 19.
Famous BGP Hijacking & Platform Blocking Cases
Pakistan Telecom vs. YouTube — The Accidental Global Blackout
On 24 February 2008, the Government of Pakistan ordered Pakistan Telecom (AS17557) to block YouTube domestically, citing objectionable content. To implement this, PTCL announced a more specific prefix — 208.65.153.0/24 — for YouTube's IP space (208.65.152.0/22). Due to BGP's longest-prefix-match preference, this sub-prefix announcement trumped YouTube's legitimate route.
Critically, PTCL's upstream provider PCCW Global (AS3491) failed to filter the announcement before propagating it globally. Within minutes, YouTube was unreachable for most of the global internet. The outage lasted approximately 2 hours. YouTube counter-announced the /24 and then split into two /25 sub-prefixes to regain routing priority.
This remains the textbook example of how a domestic censorship decision, combined with a lack of route filtering, can disrupt a major internet service for billions worldwide.
Amazon Route53 BGP Hijack — $150,000 Cryptocurrency Theft
In April 2018, attackers hijacked IP prefixes belonging to Amazon's DNS service Route53 via a Russian Autonomous System. Queries for myetherwallet.com were silently redirected to an attacker-controlled server hosting a phishing clone, resulting in the theft of approximately $150,000 worth of Ethereum.
The sophistication of this attack lies in its chain: BGP hijack → DNS redirection → SSL certificate spoofing → credential harvesting. The attackers obtained a legitimate SSL certificate for the fake site, meaning browser indicators showed the site as "secure."
Visa & Mastercard Traffic Hijack (Russian AS)
In 2017, a Russian-linked Autonomous System launched a stealthy man-in-the-middle BGP attack targeting financial networks including Visa and Mastercard. The attack was designed to intercept traffic while forwarding it to the legitimate destination — making it virtually invisible to end users.
The attack was only discovered through retrospective analysis of BGP routing tables, highlighting the difficulty of real-time detection of MitM-style hijacks.
SingNet Stealthy Hijack — Phantom Attack Discovered by Researchers
In February 2025, researchers discovered a particularly elusive BGP hijack targeting sub-prefix 203.127.225.0/24 belonging to SingNet (Singapore). The fraudulent announcement was made by Innove Communications, a Philippine network with no legitimate relationship to SingNet.
What made this attack notable: the malicious route never reached the victim's own routing view — making it a "stealthy hijack" that persisted throughout the researchers' two-month study window without triggering standard alarms.
India Blocks Telegram — The NEET-UG Fraud Crisis & Section 69A
This case occupies a unique forensic position: it is not a BGP hijack, but it is the most consequential Indian example of government-directed infrastructure-level platform blocking — achieved through the same ISP and DNS layers that BGP attacks exploit. Understanding the distinction is crucial for every forensics student.
What happened: Ahead of the NEET-UG 2026 Re-examination (conducted to redress the controversial NEET 2025 cancellation), hundreds of fraudulent Telegram channels — with names like "PAPER LEAKED NEET," "Re-NEET 2026," and "Private Mafia" — began demanding money from panicked students and parents, promising access to question papers. Critically, they used Telegram's unique silent message-editing feature (which allows previously posted messages to be altered while retaining the original timestamp) to manufacture fake "proof" of leaked papers — creating convincing digital evidence of material they did not possess.
The NTA confirmed all such material was fraudulent. But after repeated channel-level takedown requests to Telegram went unanswered at scale, MeitY issued a platform-wide block under Section 69A — the nuclear option in India's digital arsenal.
The forensic angle: The fraud operation itself demonstrates sophisticated digital crime: timestamp manipulation as evidence fabrication, social engineering of desperate examinees, and abuse of a legitimate platform's architecture. Investigators in this case would rely on Telegram channel metadata, payment trail forensics (UPI IDs, gift cards), device forensics on suspected scammer phones, and coordination with CERT-In.
The legal battle: Telegram filed a writ petition in Delhi High Court on June 17, arguing that the block "fails to consider that hundreds of thousands of students and educators rely on Telegram to access study materials" — an ironic reversal, since it was student-targeted fraud that triggered the ban. The court adjourned the matter to June 19 while the government prepared its counter-arguments.
In a BGP hijack, an attacker illegally deceives the routing infrastructure to redirect traffic. Under Section 69A, the government legally orders ISPs to block DNS resolution and IP routes to a platform. The infrastructure mechanism (DNS/IP blocking) is similar; the legal authority and intent are diametrically opposite. Both, however, result in the same user experience: the platform is unreachable.
The Forensic Science Angle: Evidence in BGP Hijacking & Platform Blocking Cases
- BGP Routing Table Anomalies: The primary forensic artefact is a change in the AS-PATH attribute. Investigators compare historical BGP routing tables (from archives like RIPE RIS and RouteViews) against the time of the incident to identify when, where, and by which AS the rogue announcement was made.
- Increased Round-Trip Time (RTT): Even in stealthy MitM attacks, network forensics tools can detect measurable increases in packet round-trip times as data travels through an unexpected extra hop — a key indicator of hijacking.
- AS-PATH Changes as Digital Fingerprints: The sequence of ASNs in the AS-PATH functions like a chain-of-custody log. Unexpected insertion of a foreign AS in the path is a fingerprint of the attack route.
- Looking Glass Servers & Route Views: Network forensic investigators use public Looking Glass servers provided by ISPs and regional internet registries to reconstruct the routing path at any point in time.
- SSL/TLS Certificate Anomalies: In DNS-based BGP hijacks, forensic analysis of Certificate Transparency logs reveals issuance of a certificate to an illegitimate actor for a domain they do not own.
- Server Access Logs & NetFlow Data: On the victim's side, unexplained drops in inbound traffic and server log gaps correspond to the window of the hijack — corroborating network-level evidence.
- Blockchain Transaction Forensics: In cryptocurrency-theft hijacks, blockchain analysis traces the exact wallets into which stolen funds were moved, providing financial chain-of-custody.
- NEW — Platform Block Forensics (Telegram 2026): In lawful Section 69A blocks, forensic investigators work with ISP compliance logs (confirming DNS suppression/IP null-routing), MeitY order records, platform-reported takedown data, and — in fraud cases like NEET — Telegram channel metadata, UPI payment trails, and device forensics on scammer handsets.
How is BGP Hijacking Detected?
Detection is challenging because BGP operates at the infrastructure layer, invisible to end users. Key detection mechanisms include:
1. BGP Monitoring Services
Tools like BGPmon, Cisco ThousandEyes, Kentik, and the open-source ARTEMIS system continuously monitor global BGP routing tables, comparing real-time announcements against known-legitimate baselines. ARTEMIS can detect and alert on a hijack in under one minute.
2. RIPE RIS and RouteViews Archives
The RIPE Network Coordination Centre's Routing Information Service (RIS) and the University of Oregon's RouteViews Project archive global BGP update data — the primary repositories used by forensic investigators to reconstruct attack timelines after the fact.
3. Increased AS-PATH Length or Unexpected AS Insertion
Legitimate routes have consistent, known AS-PATHs. Any unexpected increase in AS-PATH length or appearance of an unrecognised AS in the path is an immediate red flag, detectable by automated monitoring scripts.
4. Traceroute and Latency Analysis
Network operators can use traceroute to map the actual path packets are taking in real time. A sudden change in the hop sequence — especially through unexpected geographic regions — signals a possible hijack.
Prevention and Mitigation Strategies
1. RPKI — Resource Public Key Infrastructure
RPKI is the most significant technical advancement in BGP security. It uses a cryptographic public key infrastructure to link IP address blocks to their legitimate AS owners via digitally signed certificates called Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs). Routers performing Route Origin Validation (ROV) can automatically reject any BGP announcement that contradicts the RPKI database — effectively blocking most prefix hijacks. RPKI deployment began formally in 2009.
2. Prefix Filtering
Network operators can configure their routers to only accept BGP announcements for prefixes that a customer AS is legitimately authorised to advertise. Had PCCW applied proper prefix filtering in 2008, the Pakistan Telecom YouTube hijack would have been contained domestically.
3. MANRS (Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security)
MANRS is a global initiative backed by the Internet Society that establishes a set of minimum security actions for network operators: implementing filtering, preventing IP address spoofing, facilitating global communication, and validating routing information.
4. Real-Time BGP Monitoring
Continuous monitoring of BGP routing tables for unexpected changes to an organisation's own prefixes is essential. Commercial tools (ThousandEyes, Kentik) and open-source platforms (ARTEMIS, BGPmon) provide automated alerting.
5. BGPsec (BGP Security)
BGPsec (RFC 8205) extends RPKI to cryptographically sign the entire AS-PATH, not just the origin AS. It prevents AS-path forgery attacks. However, due to the complexity of implementation and need for universal adoption, BGPsec remains in limited deployment as of 2026.
Legal Dimensions — BGP Hijacking & Platform Blocking Under Indian Law
While there is no BGP-specific provision in Indian law, BGP hijacking implicates several existing statutes. The Telegram 2026 block has also brought Section 69A — India's most powerful digital censorship tool — into sharp focus.
| Offence / Action | Applicable Provision | Relevance |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorised access to computer systems | Section 66, IT Act 2000 | Rerouting traffic through attacker-controlled routers constitutes unauthorised access |
| Data theft / interception | Sections 43 & 66B, IT Act | Intercepting data packets during a MitM BGP hijack |
| Identity / impersonation fraud | Section 66D, IT Act | Creating fake DNS/website clones via BGP-assisted redirects |
| Cyber terrorism | Section 66F, IT Act | State-sponsored BGP attacks on critical information infrastructure |
| Critical infrastructure attacks | Section 70, IT Act (Protected Systems) | BGP attacks targeting government-declared protected systems |
| Cheating by impersonation | BNS Section 318 / former IPC 420 | If BGP hijack is used to defraud users financially |
| Government platform blocking ⬅ NEW | Section 69A, IT Act 2000 | Invoked by MeitY to block Telegram nationwide ahead of NEET-UG 2026 Re-exam (June 17–22, 2026) — largest single-platform block in India since TikTok |
| Exam fraud / cheating ring prosecution | Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024; IPC Sections on cheating | Criminal prosecution of NEET paper-leak fraud operators who used Telegram channels as their platform |
Section 69A empowers the Central Government to block public access to any online content or platform in the interests of national security, public order, defence, sovereignty, or friendly relations with foreign states. The Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) Supreme Court judgment upheld Section 69A while striking down Section 66A — confirming that platform-blocking with procedural safeguards is constitutionally valid. The Telegram 2026 challenge argues the block lacks proportionality — a new constitutional frontier in digital rights law.
BGP Hijacking falls under Network Forensics and Cyber Crime Investigation topics. Expect MCQs on: definition of BGP and Autonomous Systems; types of hijacking (exact-prefix vs. sub-prefix); famous case studies (Pakistan-YouTube 2008; MyEtherWallet 2018; India-Telegram 2026); detection methods (RPKI, BGPmon, ARTEMIS); forensic evidence types (AS-PATH logs, RTT anomalies, BGP routing archives); applicable Indian cyber law provisions (Sections 66, 66A, 66F, 69A, 70 of the IT Act); and the distinction between a criminal BGP hijack and a lawful Section 69A government block — both achieve traffic diversion but through entirely different legal and technical mechanisms.
Quick Reference Summary
| Aspect | Detail |
|---|---|
| Full Name | Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Hijacking / Prefix Hijacking / Route Hijacking / IP Hijacking |
| Protocol Exploited | BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) — internet's inter-AS routing protocol |
| Root Vulnerability | BGP has no built-in authentication; any AS can announce any prefix |
| Key Attack Types | Exact Prefix, Sub-Prefix (most damaging), Route Leak, AS-Path Manipulation, MitM, Blackholing |
| Primary Forensic Evidence | AS-PATH anomalies, BGP routing table archives (RIPE RIS, RouteViews), RTT increase, traceroute deviation, TLS certificate logs |
| Most Famous Case (Global) | Pakistan Telecom vs. YouTube, February 2008 — global outage for ~2 hours |
| Prevention — Key Tech | RPKI + ROV (Route Origin Validation), Prefix Filtering, MANRS, BGPsec |
| Indian Legal Framework (Attacks) | IT Act 2000: Sections 43, 66, 66B, 66D, 66F, 70; BNS 318; CERT-In reporting mandate |
| Detection Tools | ARTEMIS, BGPmon, Cisco ThousandEyes, Kentik, RIPE RIS Looking Glass |
| RPKI Deployed Since | 2009 (limited); growing adoption post-2020 |
| ⬅ NEW: India-Telegram Block (2026) | MeitY blocked Telegram on June 17, 2026 under Section 69A IT Act; NEET-UG 2026 fraud trigger; 150M+ users affected; block valid till June 22; Delhi HC challenge filed; largest single-app block since TikTok (2020) |
| ⬅ NEW: BGP Hijack vs. Sec 69A Block | BGP hijack = illegal attack using false routing announcements; Section 69A block = lawful government order via ISP DNS/IP suppression. Same user experience (unreachable platform), opposite legal nature. |
Conclusion
BGP hijacking is one of the most consequential and underappreciated vulnerabilities in global digital infrastructure. It exploits not a software bug, but a fundamental design assumption — that participating networks will act in good faith. When that assumption breaks, the consequences range from minutes-long global outages to months-long silent espionage operations.
The Telegram block of June 2026 adds a new dimension to this forensic landscape. It demonstrates that traffic diversion — whether by a criminal attacker forging BGP announcements or by a government invoking Section 69A — operates through the same physical layer of the internet. The mechanism is similar; the authority, intent, and legality are entirely different. For forensic science professionals, understanding this distinction is no longer academic — it is now India's lived reality.
As India strengthens its cybersecurity infrastructure, mandates stricter ISP compliance, and grapples with landmark legal challenges to platform-blocking orders, BGP security awareness is no longer optional — it is foundational.
208.65.153.0/24, PCCW propagated globally, ~2 hours outage. (2) MyEtherWallet 2018 — BGP + DNS hijack chain, cryptocurrency theft via SSL spoofing. (3) India-Telegram 2026 — Section 69A block, MeitY order, NEET fraud trigger, 150M users, Delhi HC challenge. Know the difference: Nos. 1 & 2 are crimes; No. 3 is a contested but lawful sovereign act.
Sources & References
- Datacenters.com — BGP Hijacking: Understanding, Mitigation and Best Practices (2024)
- DeepStrike — What Is BGP Hijacking? How Internet Routing Attacks Work (2025)
- LogicMonitor — BGP Hijacking: Deep Dive (2026)
- TechTarget — How does BGP hijacking work and what are the risks?
- Internet Society (ISOC) — What is BGP Hijacking, Anyway?
- Kentik — BGP Hijacking: Understanding Threats to Internet Routing
- RIPE NCC — YouTube Hijacking: A RIPE NCC RIS Case Study (2008)
- MANRS — What is BGP Prefix Hijacking? (Part 1)
- LACNIC Blog — A Brief History of the Internet's Biggest BGP Incidents (2023)
- ARTEMIS Research Paper — ARTEMIS: Neutralizing BGP Hijacking Within a Minute
- Reuters — Telegram challenges India block, saying it will hurt free speech rights (June 17, 2026)
- Al Jazeera — Telegram challenges India app ban, calls move unconstitutional (June 17, 2026)
- TechTimes — India Bans Telegram Over NEET Exam Fraud: 150 Million Users Lose Access for a Week (June 16, 2026)
- PW Live — Is Telegram Banned in India? NEET 2026 Block Explained (June 2026)
- Careers360 — Telegram link to NEET, UGC NET paper leaks unsurprising: Experts (2024)
- IJCRT — Cyber Forensics and the Law: Addressing Digital Crimes in India (2025)
- Legal Service India — Cyber Crime Laws in India 2026
